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in Otto Hölder’s Epistemology ∗
Paola Cantù
Aix-Marseille Université – CNRS, CEPERC, UMR7304,
Aix-en-Provence (France)
Résumé : L’article a pour but d’analyser la conception de la géométrie et
de la mesure présentée dans Intuition et Raisonnement [Hölder 1900], « Les
axiomes de la grandeur et la théorie de la mensuration » [Hölder 1901] et La
Méthode mathématique [Hölder 1924]. L’article examine les relations entre a)
la démarcation introduite par Hölder entre géométrie et arithmétique à partir
de la notion de ‘concept donné’, b) sa position philosophique par rapport à
l’apriorisme kantien et à l’empirisme et c) le choix du postulat de la continuité
de Dedekind parmi les axiomes de la théorie des grandeurs. L’article montre
que les choix faits au niveau axiomatique sont reliés au cadre épistémologique
et que l’originalité de Hölder consiste surtout dans son analyse au cas par cas
des procédures déductives en mathématiques.
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to analyze Hölder’s understanding of ge-
ometry and measurement presented in Intuition and Reasoning [Hölder 1900],
“The Axioms of Quantity and the Theory of Measurement” [Hölder 1901], and
The Mathematical Method [Hölder 1924]. The paper explores the relations
between a) Hölder’s demarcation of geometry from arithmetic based on the
notion of given concepts, b) his philosophical stance towards Kantian aprior-
ism and empiricism, and c) the choice of Dedekind’s continuity in the axiomatic
formulation of the theory of magnitudes. The paper shows that the choices
made at the axiomatic level reflect Hölder’s epistemological framework, and
individuates the originality of his approach in the case by case analysis of
deductive procedures.
∗ The author would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable
constructive criticism of this paper, and Volker Peckhaus, Oliver Schlaudt, Philippe
Nabonnand, Gerhard Heinzmann together with all the participants of the Workshop
on Hölder held in Nancy in 2010 for their precious comments in relation to a preli-
minary version.
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1 Introduction
Otto Hölder is known for his results on the theory of groups (see [Gray 1994],
[Schlimm 2008]) and for the paper on the axiomatic theory of measurement
published in 1901 under the title “The Axioms of Quantity and the Theory of
Measurement” (see [Diez 1997], [Darrigol 2003], [Michell 1993]). Less investi-
gated are the epistemological considerations on the relations between geome-
try, arithmetic and theory of measurement that Hölder developed before and
after this paper: most of them are contained either in the paper Intuition and
Reasoning [Hölder 1900] or in the volume The Mathematical Method [Hölder
1924]. 1 Further remarks on indirect proofs (see [Hölder 1929], [Hölder 1930]),
fallacies of circularity in mathematics (see [Hölder 1926]), the axiomatization
of mathematics (see [Hölder 1931], [Radu 2003]), and the paradoxes are con-
tained in several minor articles published between 1926 and 1931.
1.1 Continuity, deduction and axiomatics
Hölder’s epistemology is centered on the investigation of the notion of deduc-
tion: its relation to geometry was first investigated in Intuition and Reasoning
[Hölder 1900] and further developed in The Mathematical Method [Hölder
1924], which is explicitly presented as a critical reaction to Russell, Couturat
and Natorp. The paper investigates some historical and philosophical ques-
tions about the distinction between geometry and arithmetic, deduction and
experience, synthetic and given. 1) Does Hölder endorse the Grassmannian
distinction between formal and empirical sciences and agree with Gauß and
Helmholtz about the empirical nature of geometry? 2) How does Hölder com-
bine a rather empirical conception of geometry with the Kantian terminology
(‘synthetic’ opposed to ‘given’) used to describe it? 3) Are the primitive con-
cepts of the theory of measurable magnitudes given or constructed? What is
the status of the Archimedean axiom?
Hölder’s approach was devoted to the investigation of the possible rela-
tions between deduction and experience—a classical epistemological problem
that he investigated in an original perspective, i.e., on the basis of a case by
case analysis of the use of deduction in several mathematical disciplines: ge-
ometry, mechanics, measurement theory, the theory of continuum, analytical
geometry, the theory of manifolds, the theory of integration and differenti-
ation, the theory of real and imaginary numbers, and the theory of prime
numbers. In modern terminology, one could say that Hölder was particularly
interested in mathematical practice, believing that the logical investigation of
the mathematical method should not precede but follow the analysis of math-
1. Given that there is an English translation of the 1899 paper published in this
issue but no English translation of the 1924 volume, I will often quote more extensively
from the latter rather than from the former. Translations from [Hölder 1924] are mine.
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ematical theories and examples, and should not limit itself to number theory,
but include all relevant mathematical disciplines [Hölder 1924, 1–3].
This case by case investigation of mathematics, developed during the First
World War and published with minor changes more than ten years later, is
based on the idea that logic might be field-dependent, i.e., that a general logic
might only arise from the investigation of the deductive procedures used in
specific mathematical disciplines. 2 Hölder, unlike most of his contemporaries,
claimed that if logic is the science of deduction, then it cannot itself be built
deductively [Hölder 1924, 2–3, 277], and that symbolic language, although
useful to express mathematics, is not as useful in logic, where new symbols
and new concepts are often introduced, requiring at each time new linguistic
clarifications and comments [Hölder 1924, 5]. The ordinary language, thanks
to its tonality and suggestive power, was thus praised as the language best
suited to investigate deduction [Hölder 1924, 7–8].
According to Hölder, an essential characteristic of mathematics is that it
allows the construction of concepts: the aim of his logic of mathematics is thus
the investigation of different ways in which concepts might be constructed (as
pure synthetic concepts in arithmetic and as hypothetico-synthetic concepts
in geometry). The notion of deduction is related to the mathematical activity
of construction of concepts, and thus to the Kantian perspective, which is
the object of an internal criticism. The main question is still Kantian: “how
can pure mathematics be possible?”, but the border between a priori and non
a priori knowledge is differently drawn: geometry does not belong to pure
mathematics [Hölder 1924, 5–8].
If geometry is a science whose primitive axioms have their origin in ex-
perience, and measurement theory, like geometry, “can be based upon a set
of facts”, why does the latter include among its axioms the postulate of
Dedekind’s continuity? The latter is a consequence of the commonly accepted
axiom of Archimedes, but in the 1901 paper, Hölder had developed an origi-
nal example of a non-Archimedean continuum (containing infinitely great and
small quantities): why did he not further develop this intuition? To under-
stand Hölder’s axiomatic choices, a deep understanding of the peculiarity of his
epistemological framework is no less useful than a clear understanding of the
technical differences between his model and other contemporary approaches
to non-Archimedean continuity by Bettazzi and Veronese.
1.2 Plan of the paper
In section 2, I will briefly sketch Hölder’s conception of ‘given’ concepts in
geometry. Hölder’s epistemology was deeply influenced by the debate on the
relationship between geometry and experience raised by Gauß, Graßmann and
2. Among the precursors of this enterprise, Hölder quotes Lambert’s New Organon
[Lambert 1764], Pasch’s Lectures on Modern Geometry [Pasch 1882] and Hilbert’s
Foundations of Geometry [Hilbert 1899].
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Helmholtz, but also by some remarks by Konrad Zindler, a disciple of Meinong.
Hölder’s epistemology can be better understood in the light of his interest for
deduction and for case by case analysis of mathematical practice, which led
him to oppose logicism as well as Kantianism, but also to discuss some limits
of empiricism.
In section 3, I will discuss whether Hölder might be considered as a fol-
lower of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and at the same time a supporter
of Pasch’s empiricism. In particular, I will focus my attention on the reasons
why Hölder used a Kantian terminology (‘synthetic’ as opposed to ‘given’)
even if he criticized Kant’s conception. I will claim that in around 1900
Hölder was surely nearer to Pasch’s empirical understanding of mathemat-
ics and to Helmholtz’s epistemology rather than to Kant’s philosophy, even
if he did not consider the Kantian position as provably wrong, and adopted
a terminology that became more Kantian in his later work (see for example
the distinction ‘given’–‘constructed’ being substituted by the distinction ‘pure
synthetic’–‘hypothetico-synthetic’).
In section 4, I will discuss the relations between this idea of ‘given’ and
Hölder’s conception of continuity, which is at the base of his theory of measure-
ment. Hölder’s theory of measurable magnitudes is quite different from the
theories developed by Veronese, Bettazzi and Hilbert: it is Archimedean, and
even Dedekind-continuous. I will discuss the role of the Archimedean axiom
and of Dedekind’s postulate with respect to experience.
In section 5, I will outline some complex relations between Hölder’s episte-
mology, as it emerges from the reconstruction made in section 2 and section 3,
and the conceptions of other 19th century mathematicians and philosophers.
The originality of Hölder’s epistemological approach to geometry and mea-
surement will thus appear more clearly.
2 A demarcation between arithmetic and
geometry
Hölder’s philosophy of mathematics is based on the “traditional” idea that
there is a fundamental difference between arithmetic and geometry. This idea
is traditional inasmuch as it was introduced by the Greeks and maintained un-
altered up to late modernity, when the development of algebra began to outline
correspondences and similarities between discrete and continuous quantities.
The 19th century, from Gauß to Helmholtz, was the time for the introduction
of a new distinction, no longer based on a qualitative distinction between the
two disciplines—the former being the science of (discrete) plurality and the
second the science of (continuous) magnitude—but rather on their relation-
ship to experience. The former is a pure science based on definitions, while the
latter is a natural science (it is part of physics) and based on axioms. Once
the distinction is related not to the kind of objects the sciences are applied
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to, but to a difference in the origin of their concepts and in their formulation,
the investigation of the relations between intuition, experience and mathemat-
ical rigor in geometrical deductions becomes the most relevant epistemological
question. Hölder introduced a shift, separating the question of the origin of
the concepts, which he considered as a question that pertains to philosophy
of mathematics, from the question of the demarcation between arithmetic and
geometry. The latter is essentially a mathematical question and can be an-
swered by a thorough consideration of several examples of primitive concepts
with respect to the activity of construction needed to introduce them.
2.1 What is ‘given’?
The idea that geometrical objects and properties are ‘given’ and not con-
structed by our thought goes back to Gauß and Graßmann. It is well known
that Gauß remarked that space also has a reality outside our mind, and that
we cannot describe a priori the laws of that reality, at least not entirely a pri-
ori. 3 Graßmann distinguished formal and real sciences, according to the fact
that they investigate a being that is posited from thought itself or that faces
thought as something autonomous. 4 Given objects are objects that confront
our thought and whose properties are independent from our mental activities.
This conception of ‘given’ as some physical reality that exists independently
and autonomously from our thought is often associated in the 19th century to
the idea that geometry is an empirical science, and more precisely a part of
physics (Gauß, Graßmann, Helmholtz) or at most a mixed science, i.e., partly
empirical and partly formal (Veronese).
In Intuition and Reasoning Hölder held a view that does not entirely agree
with Gauß’s perspective: 1) firstly, he used the term ‘given’ in a different sense:
this results in the fact that not all geometrical concepts are given; 2) secondly,
even when he discussed the philosophical question of the origin of ‘given’, he
remarked that it might originate either in experience or in intuition, and did
not explicitly refute the Kantian conception.
2.1.1 Three meanings of the term ‘given’
The term ‘given’ occurs very often in Intuition and Reasoning, but its meaning
is not always clear. Sometimes it refers to concepts that “are available to the
3. See the letters to Bessel dated 9 April 1830 and 27 January 1829. In the latter
Gauß remarked that his belief that geometry cannot be grounded entirely a priori
had become stronger [Gauß 1900, vol. VIII, 200–201].
4. “The principal division of the sciences is into the real and the formal. The
real represent the existent in thought as existing independently of thought, and their
truth consists in the correspondence of the thought with that existent. The formal on
the other hand have as their object what has been produced by thought alone, and
their truth consists in the correspondence between the thought processes themselves”
[Graßmann 1844, xxi, Eng. trans., 23].
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geometer as a given material”, 5 sometimes it refers to concepts that are not
“defined by means of a construction”, 6 sometimes to concepts that are “given
within intuition”, 7 sometimes to concepts that are not constructed but “taken
from intuition or experience”. 8
To understand Hölder’s remarks, I will first distinguish between three pos-
sible meanings of the term ‘given’: 1) epistemological , 2) axiomatic, 3) genetic.
1. According to the epistemological meaning, something ‘given’ is some-
thing that is epistemologically accessible via experience or intuition,
i.e., by means of our senses—be they exterior or inner. In Intuition and
reasoning, Hölder remarked that what is given in geometry might be ei-
ther given empirically or given within intuition, but he rather preferred
the first option, which guarantees more freedom—claiming that philoso-
phers who consider geometrical concepts as given within intuition tend
on the contrary to criticize the choice of non intuitive concepts as prim-
itive concepts [Hölder 1900, 11, Eng. trans. 20]. There is no one-to-one
correspondence between ‘given’ and primitive concepts, because some
primitive concepts might be constructed rather than ‘given’ in intuition
or in experience. Moreover, some “concepts which were clearly immedi-
ately abstracted from intuition, can later be deduced” [Hölder 1900, 15,
Eng. trans. 23]. 9 This notion of ‘given’ is an epistemological distinction
that is relative to the state of our knowledge; it is thus different from
the logical notion of primitiveness used in modern axiomatics. 10
2. According to the axiomatic meaning, ‘given’ refers to concepts that occur
in the primitive propositions of a mathematical theory, whatever the
epistemological access we might have to them, or whatever the kind of
5. “Beside these concepts, which are available to the geometer as a given material,
some assertions of a more general kind (which hold or should hold for these concepts)
are also established from the beginning; these fundamental facts, being presupposed
without proof, are called axioms or postulates” [Hölder 1900, 1, Eng. trans., 16].
Italics in this and in the following two quotations are mine.
6. “Some concepts are defined by means of a construction, others are basically
taken as given” [Hölder 1900, 1, Eng. trans., 15].
7. “[Philosophers] consider Euclid’s axiom of parallel lines as necessarily given
within intuition, and consider any geometry that operates intuitively with some other
assumption as an absurdity” [Hölder 1900, 6, Eng. trans., 20].
8. “We distinguished in geometry between primary concepts (taken from intuition
or experience) on the one hand, and geometrically constructed concepts on the other
hand” [Hölder 1900, 15, Eng. trans., 23].
9. Hölder refers here to the similitude of figures, which can be either intuited and
used to ground the concept of ratio, or derived from the theory of proportions, as
Euclid did. Even if “it may be taken as an immediate intuitive fact that we can
reproduce a body with its proper form but on a different scale” [Hölder 1900, 15,
Eng. trans. 23], Hölder seems to believe that this is the result of a construction from
more primary concepts rather than a fact that is ‘given within intuition’.
10. See Hölder’s terminological distinction between ‘primary’ concepts [ur-
sprüngliche Begriffe] and ‘primitive’ concepts [Grundbegriffe].
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construction that might be used to explain them. In this case, all the
concepts of an axiomatic theory would be ‘given’, but several concepts
that are ‘given’ in a theory might not be ‘given’ in a different axiomatic
theory. 11 The distinction between given and constructed would thus be
reduced to the opposition between primitive and derived, and would of
course make sense only inside an axiomatic framework. This distinction
is relative (to a given axiomatic theory). Yet, the term ‘given’ does not
occur in this meaning in the paper on measurable magnitudes, where
Hölder builds an axiomatic theory: on the contrary, ‘given’ is used there
only in the technical sense of ‘data’ in a mathematical proof.
3. According to the genetic meaning, a ‘given’ is something whose prop-
erties can be determined without any activity, i.e., without executing
any operation. According to this meaning, geometrical concepts are
partly ‘given’ and partly not. This distinction is best developed in The
Mathematical Method, but is already present in Intuition and Reasoning,
especially where Hölder makes reference to a paper by Konrad Zindler.
My claim will be that Hölder’s use of the term ‘given’ can be under-
stood according to the third sense both in Intuition and Reasoning and in
The Mathematical Method, where he discussed mathematical questions such
as the difference between arithmetic and geometry, or the nature of primitive
propositions in mathematics (see sections 2.1.2 and 2.2). The term is on the
contrary used in the epistemological meaning when Hölder makes reference to
the philosophical discussion about the genesis of geometrical knowledge (see
section 3).
2.1.2 Given versus constructed
The distinction between given and constructed concepts was influenced, as
Hölder himself declared, by an article published in 1889 by a student of
Meinong: Konrad Zindler, who claimed that geometry takes representations of
space as given and does not investigate their origin. 12 Zindler believed that the
problem of the correspondence between geometrical truths and the external
world is a question raised by physics that does not concern geometry. 13
11. See for example Pasch’s remarks on geometrical concepts: “These concepts are
said to refer to position. They are thus introduced as derived with respect to geomet-
rical fundamental concepts. Yet, if, without adding other geometrical concepts, one
derives from them further concepts taken to refer to position, then one might take
the derived concepts as stem concepts [Stammbegriffe] that precede the others inside
the group of concepts that refer to position” [Pasch 1882, 74, my trans.].
12. “In mathematics but not in philosophy of mathematics should the axioms be
the starting point” [Zindler 1889, 2ff.].
13. “In mathematics the representation of space should be considered as given. It
is unnecessary to take into account how our representation could have originated—
geometry is indispensable also in physiological and psychological investigations on the
meaning of space and already finds the most extensive application—, how it relates
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Although Hölder mentioned Zindler in several parts of Intuition and
Reasoning, he did not explicitly mention Zindler’s distinction between geomet-
rical objects that are taken as given and arithmetical concepts that are not. 14
Yet this division is quite similar to Hölder’s own distinction between concepts
that are given and concepts that are constructed: in both cases axiomatic con-
cepts are opposed to concepts that occur in the theory of numbers. According
to Zindler, in arithmetic there is just one determinate primitive concept from
which all others can be considered as developed, whereas in geometry there
are several concepts that cannot be inter-defined, such as direction, point,
distance, coincidence of figures, area, volume, and space [Zindler 1889, 1–3]. 15
Hölder, like Zindler, believed geometrical primitive concepts to be ax-
iomatic inasmuch as they are taken as given, but unlike him he distinguished
two kinds of axiomatic concepts: concepts that denote objects and concepts
that denote relations [Hölder 1901, 3n, Eng. trans., I, 247]. Zindler, on the con-
trary, had claimed that all primitive concepts of geometry denote comparative
relations, quoting Meinong’s article [Meinong 1882] on the theory of relations
for the study of compatibility and incompatibility between relations. 16
2.2 The demarcation between geometry and
arithmetic
The distinction between given and constructed is explicitly used in The
Mathematical Method to demarcate arithmetic from geometry. The difference
relies on the fact that arithmetic concerns only constructed, or—as Hölder
called them in The Mathematical Method—synthetic concepts, i.e., concepts
that have their source in some activity, whereas geometry concerns both con-
structed (synthetic) and given concepts. 17 The examples of given concepts
to an objective real space, what sense could this question about an objective real
space have and whether this question has any sense at all” [Zindler 1889, 2ff.].
14. Yet, both in the paper on measurable magnitudes and in The mathematical
method Hölder mentioned Zindler’s use of the term axiomatic to denote concepts
that occur in the axioms. See [Hölder 1901, 3n, Eng. trans., I, 247], [Hölder 1924,
10] and [Hölder 1924, 10].
15. “When we look for the primitive geometrical representations we cannot spec-
ify a single wholly determined primitive concept that might be considered as the
starting point of the development of other concepts, but there are here several fun-
damental representations that are reciprocally irreducible and undefinable. Such are
for example the direction, the point, the distance, the concept of coincidence or of
superposition of geometrical figures, of surfaces, of volumes, and of course of space
itself” [Zindler 1889, 3].
16. “Objects that fall under one of the previously introduced primitive concepts are
accessible comparative relations, as the possibility of their quantitative measurement
(measure of lengths, measure of surface, measure of solids, measure of angles) shows”
[Zindler 1889, 2ff.].
17. Hölder distinguished the synthesis that is at stake in the formation of concepts
from the synthesis that is at stake in the formation of judgements and that is as-
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mentioned in 1924 include those mentioned in 1899, i.e., point, line and plane,
which are concepts denoting objects, but also concepts that denote relations,
such as the relation of betweenness. As an example of a concept that is on
the contrary synthetic (and precisely hypothetico-synthetic), Hölder mentions
a line segment, because it can be defined as a couple of points [Hölder 1924,
10–11]. Another example of a constructed concept is the square, which can
be constructed from the concepts of segment and angle. More generally, all
geometrical constructed (hypothetico-synthetic) concepts are obtained by ex-
ecuting a series of operations in a given order: the possibility of executing
those operations in the mentioned order is guaranteed by the axioms [Hölder
1924, 10–11]. Synthetic concepts, like given concepts, might denote an ob-
ject or a relation: for example, the square denotes an object, whereas the
property of a plane figure of being obtained by a—perpendicular, parallel or
central—projection from another figure is a relation [Hölder 1924, 12].
This insistence on the difference between concepts of objects and concepts
of relations is important a) to determine the extent of Meinong’s influence,
b) to explain the tension between Hölder’s own conception of geometry and
the modern axiomatic conception, and c) to understand how Hölder managed
to demarcate arithmetic from geometry: the main difference between the two
relies exactly on the fact that the latter contains some concepts that cannot
be defined synthetically. 18
In arithmetic one considers only things that correspond to our activity
together with their relations: mathematical concepts are thus all constructed,
but not from given concepts, so they are called ‘pure synthetic concepts’: ex-
amples are numbers, but also groups and permutations. 19 In arithmetic there
sociated to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. This use of
the term ‘synthetic’ is thus different from Kant’s use, as Hölder himself remarked.
One would expect Hölder to avoid, for the sake of clarity, to use a Kantian term in
a non-Kantian meaning, given that he elsewhere remarked that many philosophical
distinctions that were originally introduced with one meaning and are subsequently
maintained with a different meaning usually generate more confusion than clarifica-
tion of concepts [Hölder 1924, 292n, 361]. So, presumably, he must have had some
strong reasons for maintaining the Kantian term, as if he wanted his approach to
remain Kantian, notwithstanding the differences.
18. “Thereby, between the arithmetico-combinatorial domain and geometry (or re-
spectively mechanics) there is the essential difference that in the former domain
one does not assume any such given element as in geometry the point and the
line, nor any given and non synthetically definable—i.e., non logically derivable—
relation, nor any law (axiom) with respect to those elements and their relations”
[Hölder 1924, 295].
19. “With reference to what I have just said, I would like to distinguish the
hypothetico-synthetic concept from the pure synthetic concept, depending on the
fact that the concept is or is not set up on assumptions similar to those that are
made in geometry and in mechanics. One could express it by saying that there is
something empirical that inheres in the hypothetico-synthetic concept, so that the
elements that compose it together with the relevant relations have some meaning in
experience, and also the previously assumed laws (axioms) originate in experience or
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are no given objects, so the construction cannot be hypothetico-synthetic, and
there cannot be any axioms. 20
Even if in arithmetic there are no ‘given’ concepts, there are of course
primitive concepts that are used to build other concepts, as happens in the
arithmetical activities of composing, removing, assembling and separating that
generate concepts of higher order, wholes composed of parts [Hölder 1924, 295–
296]. Hölder explicitly compared his pure synthetic concepts with Meinong’s
objects of higher order, considered as wholes composed of parts and their rela-
tions: e.g., a rectangular triangle whose internal surface is green. But Hölder
remarked upon a relevant difference: according to Meinong, the parts and the
whole derive their meaning from external experience, while this holds, accord-
ing to Hölder, only for geometrical concepts [Hölder 1924, 296]. Hölder added
that Meinong’s distinction between Zusammenstellung and Zusammensetzung
could be interpreted as relying on an opposition between two distinct kinds
of operations: on the one hand, to add and to remove, to bring together and
to pull apart, to order in a sequence and to assign; on the other hand, to
superpose segments, to join bodies, and to apply forces [Hölder 1924, 296–
297]. This is interesting, because the operations mentioned with respect to
Meinong’s Zusammenstellung are the same that occur in the examples of pure
synthetic concepts: to order in a sequence is the basic activity for natural
numbers taken as positional numbers (Stellenzeichen), whereas the relation of
assigning is the activity on which the notion of cardinal number (Anzahl) is
based [Hölder 1924, 161ff.].
2.2.1 Hölder and modern axiomatics
Modern axiomatics is based on the idea that different primitives can be used
in the axiomatization of the same theory. Furthermore, the properties of the
intuition” [Hölder 1924, 295]. The examples are quoted in the introduction [Hölder
1924, 6].
20. “In arithmetic the abstraction of new general concepts and rules thus forms in a
way a constituent of deduction, and the procedure providing the basis of abstraction
is a process we do not count among experience in a narrower sense of the word, that is
to say in opposition to reasoning. Having said this, I want to assert that arithmetic—
at least in so far as it concerns whole and rational numbers [...]—has no axioms in the
proper sense, and that the arithmetical proof process is not a purely formal process,
but a mixed and extremely complex process” [Hölder 1900, 61–62, Eng. trans. 43].
See also [Hölder 1924, 6, 295ff.]. The distinction between arithmetic, that contains
definitions but no axioms, and geometry, that contains axioms, was introduced by
Hermann Graßmann in a similar way: “Thus proof in the formal sciences does not
extend beyond the sphere of thought, but resides purely in the combination of different
thought processes. Consequently, the formal sciences cannot begin with axioms,
as do the real; rather, definitions comprise their foundation. (Although postulates
have been introduced into the formal sciences, for example in arithmetic, this is to
be regarded as an error, only to be explained by the corresponding treatment of
geometry.)” [Graßmann 1844, 22, Engl. trans. 23].
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primitives might be altered and different systems obtained. How are these two
things possible, if geometry has to begin from ‘given’ concepts, implying that
these concepts cannot be altered at will?
Hölder’s belief that among the given concepts of geometry there are not
only relational concepts, such as betweenness, containment and congruence,
but also primitive concepts denoting objects, illustrates a relevant difference
between Hölder and Hilbert. With this respect, Hölder is nearer to Veronese
than to Hilbert, because he considered certain geometrical data as non al-
terable, as concepts that cannot be different from what they are taken to be
in our representation of space. This might be a reason why he did not con-
sider a non-Archimedean theory of magnitudes, even if he had developed a
non-Archimedean model of it (see further section 4).
Yet, sometimes Hölder seemed to admit that one might substitute a derived
concept for a given one in a system.
As a result of a modification of the whole system of geometry it
might anyway happen that afterwards a synthetic concept also
occurs in place of a concept that was previously treated as given.
[Hölder 1924, 12]
Does Hölder mean here that given concepts can also be presented as syn-
thetic concepts, provided the axiomatic formulation of the theory is modified?
The above passage seems to introduce a tension between the genetic meaning
of given used in the previously mentioned passages, and the axiomatic mean-
ing that seems to be used here. Some remarks on Hölder’s conception of the
axiomatic method might be helpful to clarify this issue.
The preference for the Euclidean and the Kantian use of deduction and the
suspiciousness towards the modern construction of “connected chains of infer-
ences” [Hölder 1924, 2] might be related to the fact that an axiomatic system
cannot itself describe the content of axiomatic systems having different axioms.
This is one reason why deduction cannot be used to study deduction itself.
In particular, symbolical logic cannot establish the relation between different
axiom systems and experience. Van der Waerden has suggested a Gödelian
interpretation of the above-mentioned passage, claiming that Hölder’s mis-
trust in the possibility of formalizing the whole of mathematics relied on the
idea that the concepts and inferences developed at one stage of mathemat-
ics immediately underwent a logical analysis (e.g., counting the steps of the
deduction), and thereby became themselves objects of investigation [van der
Waerden 1938, 161].
This interpretation, although developed in order to show that Hölder had
somehow foreseen Gödel’s critical results, might also be used as an explana-
tion of the problem mentioned above: how is it possible that concepts based
on some activity assume the role of ‘given’? Concepts of higher order that are
evidently derived by means of inferences, might themselves become objects of
investigation at some higher level (that of logical analysis, for example), and
thus play the role of ‘given’: so, for example, something that is obtained by
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a first-level activity might itself become a ‘given’ in metamathematical inves-
tigations, where the kind of activity involved in the construction of synthetic
concepts is of a higher kind.
3 The origin of ‘given’: Kantian intuition vs.
empirical experience
Paul du Bois-Reymond in the introduction to his The General Theory of
Functions [du Bois-Reymond 1882, 138] had referred to the debate on the foun-
dations of mathematics as an opposition between two positions: the idealists,
admitting the existence of limits, and the empiricists, trying to limit mathe-
matics to the realm of finite experience. Hölder—attesting thus his familiarity
(if not affiliation) with the Kantian tradition—suggested that the fundamental
question in philosophy of mathematics is the relation between intuition and
deduction. On the one hand Hölder discussed the role of intuition in proofs,
as I will briefly outline in section 3.1. On the other hand he discussed the role
of intuition in the origin of given geometrical concepts: are they derived from
a priori intuition (Kant) or taken from experience (Helmholtz, but also Lotze,
Baumann, Volkelt)? 21 In the first case, intuition is “considered as the source
of geometrical knowledge”, whereas in the second case it “appears, conversely,
as a result of experience” from which geometrical knowledge is derived [Hölder
1900, 3, Eng. trans. 16]. This question, together with its effects on Hölder’s
stance on apriorism and empiricism, will be discussed in section 3.2.
3.1 Intuition and deduction
Otto Hölder’s fundamental aim in Intuition and Reasoning, as well as in The
Mathematical Method was precisely the analysis of mathematical deduction.
He claimed that intuition plays no role in deduction, or rather, as Pasch had
rather put it in the Lectures on Modern Geometry (1882), should not play
any role in a complete and reliable deductive process. 22 Mathematical rigor is
21. Here the term ‘given’ is used in the epistemological sense introduced in sec-
tion 2.1.1.
22. “The fundamental propositions should include all empirical material mathemat-
ics has to deal with, so that once those propositions have been set, there is no need
to go back to sense perceptions anymore. Actually, in order for geometry to be re-
ally deductive, the process of deduction should everywhere be independent from the
sense of geometrical concepts, and also independent from figures. Only the relations
between the geometrical concepts laid down in the used propositions or definitions
can be taken into account. On the contrary, it is certainly admissible and useful
for deduction, but in no way necessary, to take into account the meaning of the ge-
ometrical concepts that occur in it, so that precisely when this becomes necessary,
the incompleteness of deduction and, if the gap cannot be filled by some change in
the reasoning, the unreliability of the propositions that have been previously used as
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Pasch’s main aim: intuition should be eliminated from deduction but its pres-
ence in the axioms might be accepted, because it is harmless or even precious
in order to understand the empirical origin of mathematics. Yet Hölder raises
the question once more and in an explicit way, against those philosophers (i.e.,
Kant) who believe that intuition might play a role in deduction too.
Now, what role does intuition play in deduction itself? Are the
elements being combined in the deduction, and the rules according
to which they are combined, all what is taken from intuition, or
respectively from experience? Or does intuition co-operate also
in the single steps of deduction? The latter point of view has
been mainly defended by philosophers and seems to have been
also Kant’s point of view, as he saw in intuition the essential
principle for obtaining geometrical knowledge. [Hölder 1900, 11,
Eng. trans. 20]
To show that intuition does not necessarily occur in geometrical deduction,
Hölder suggests a procedure that differs from the one followed by Pasch: 23 the
best way to make Euclid’s implicit appeals to intuition explicit, is to trans-
form geometry into a calculus, as Peano did in his Geometrical Calculus [Peano
1888]. 24 Since a purely logical proof in geometry is possible—even if intuition
plays a role in the kind of reasoning that leads effectively to the discovery of
a certain result [Hölder 1900, 15, Eng. trans. 23]—it is useless to assume an
a priori intuition of space in order to explain geometrical proofs (the Kantian
demonstration means arise” [Pasch 1882, 98, my trans.]. On Pasch’s philosophy of
mathematics see in particular [Schlimm 2010].
23. Pasch did not transform geometry into a calculus, but was rather interested
in the duality principle and in the possibility of deriving theorems from primitive
propositions by logical means rather than by observation of given figures. This was
obtained by identifying as primitives several relevant relations between points and
lines, so that it could be possible to interpret the primitive propositions by means
of alternative concepts (lines and points respectively) and yet obtain valid theorems
[Pasch 1882, 98].
24. “By means of such a formulation of all intuitive assumptions, one can divest
geometrical deduction itself of intuition. If one denotes the geometrical elements
and the operations on these elements through symbols and through successions of
symbols—just as in algebra one symbolically represents the numerical magnitudes
and the operations to be carried out on them—so, in the simplest cases, it is possible
to entirely reduce the geometrical deduction into a calculus that is carried out on
symbols, just as in algebra the inferences concerning numerical magnitudes are car-
ried out by means of the so-called letter-calculus. Such a calculus has already been
accomplished for single domains of geometry; Peano has assembled these symbolical
procedures” [Hölder 1900, 14, Eng. trans. 22]. Hölder is well known for his remarks
on the limits of symbolism (see e.g., section 2.2.1 above and especially the contribu-
tion by Mircea Radu in this volume [Radu 2013]), but this does not mean that he
denied the use of symbolical calculi or its merits in certain cases, as it is evident from
the above quotation.
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thesis is not necessary for the understanding of deduction). 25 Against the
usual objection that geometrical deduction is based on intuition because it
makes recourse to auxiliary figures, Hölder argued that this procedure cor-
responds to the introduction of appropriate existential propositions. To the
objection that in certain proofs the geometer reasons by analogy with objects
of intuition, Hölder answered that such proofs can be rigorously formulated
without any recourse to analogy [Hölder 1900, 10–13, Eng. trans. 20–21].
3.2 A partial criticism to Kant
Even if he suggested several arguments in defense of the empirical origin of
geometrical objects, in the 1899 lecture Hölder did not attempt to advance a
definitive argument against the Kantian interpretation. There is hardly any
doubt that Hölder shared an empirical conception of geometry. His remarks
on the origin of geometry from raw experience and the subsequent process of
idealization 26 do not substantially differ from Pasch’s remarks on the origin
of geometrical objects. 27 Yet, Hölder did not explicitly adhere to a specific
version of empiricism. Although strongly influenced by Helmholtz, as is par-
ticularly evident both in the 1901 and in the 1924 essays, Hölder considered
two possible ways to explain Pasch’s idea that geometrical objects derive from
experience: either they derive from immediate perceptions (Helmholtz) or
they derive from memories of perceptions (Baumann, Wundt) [Hölder 1900,
3, Eng. trans. 28]. Furthermore, Hölder’s arguments offered a general defense
of empiricism rather than a defense of Helmholtz’s approach.
If Hölder evidently shared an empiricist account of geometry, why was he
so cautious about the Kantian conception? Why did he not refute it? There
are probably some practical reasons: Hölder was presenting the state of the
25. “The recent knowledge of the possibility to represent a geometrical proof in a
purely logical way frees us from the necessity to assume an a priori intuition of space
for the sake of the geometrical proof” [Hölder 1924, 28].
26. “We figured ourselves the geometrical concepts of point, straight line, surface
and so on together with their corresponding relations as formed according to expe-
rience, certainly a relatively raw experience [...]. Once we arrived at certain regular
relations, idealization arose: we imagine that there could be exact points, exact
straight lines, and that one might establish exactly whether a given point lies on
a given straight line or not, and at the same time we assume that for these exact
concepts the regular relations or axioms have unconditioned validity” [Hölder 1924,
397].
27. “The successful application that geometry encounters continuously both in nat-
ural sciences and in practical life is based only on the fact that geometrical concepts
originally corresponded exactly to empirical objects. Even if they were gradually over-
drawn by a net of artificial concepts in order to promote the theoretical development,
and inasmuch as one limits oneself, from the beginning, to the empirical nucleus,
geometry maintains the character of a natural science, distinguished from other parts
of the science of nature, because it needs to derive immediately from experience only
a very small amount of concepts and laws” [Pasch 1882, iii, my trans.].
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matter concerning the foundational problem of geometry rather than imposing
his own point of view with definitive arguments—a reasonable thing to do in
an inaugural lecture. This might also explain why he did not defend just
one version of empiricism, but discussed the differences between the appeal to
immediate perceptions and the explanation based on remembered perceptions.
But there might also be methodological and epistemological reasons, as I will
claim in the following section.
3.2.1 Empiricism is consistent and preferable
Firstly, Hölder considered himself as a working mathematician that investi-
gated the theory of knowledge of his own discipline rather than as a profes-
sional philosopher [Hölder 1924, 1], and thus did not venture in a confutation
of a philosophical position. 28 He contented himself with arguments showing
that empiricism was consistent and preferable. That Hölder held a clear pref-
erence for the empiricist viewpoint, is clearly attested by the fact that he put
forward some arguments to show that the empirical origin of geometry might
be legitimate or even preferred to the idea that the properties of geometrical
objects are determined by an a priori intuition. The arguments are not pre-
sented as a confutation of Kant, but rather aimed at defending the legitimacy,
if not the preferability, of alternative conceptions.
Secondly, Hölder refuted the objection that the empirical origin of geo-
metrical concepts might be based on a fallacy of circularity: as Helmholtz had
shown, 29 there are some observations—facts of immediate perception—“that
are not themselves grounded in geometrical considerations” [Hölder 1900, 4,
Eng. trans. 17]. For example, one might derive the geometrical notion of a
straight line from some physical observations concerning the line of sight or a
tensioned thread, and the distinction between a plastic and a rigid body from
the observation that after manipulation of a given material, it might be more
or less easy to recover the original visual representation of the object [Hölder
1900, 5–6, Eng. trans. 16–17]. Hölder also considered the fact that the proper-
ties of rigid bodies might be determined by a set of subsequent measurements
and the geometrical theorems might be the result of induction, but he ac-
knowledged that one cannot thereby exclude the possibility that the Kantian
notion of a priori intuition might be compatible with that explanation. Yet,
28. Like Zindler, Hölder believed that to investigate geometry from a mathematical
point of view, it suffices to know that some of its concepts are taken as given: it is
not necessary to discuss how they are given to us.
29. See in particular The facts of perception [Helmholtz 1884, 218], but also Die
Anwendbarkeit der Axiome auf die physische Welt [The applicability of the axioms to
the physical world], supplement to Die neuere Entwickelung von Faraday’s Ideen über
Elektricität [The recent development of Faraday’s ideas about electricity] [Helmholtz
1884, 405]. Note that the title itself of Hölder’s lecture is inspired by Helmholtz’s
question: “Was ist Wahrheit in unserem Anschauen und Denken? [What is truth in
our intuition and reasoning?]” [Helmholtz 1884, 218].
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in favour of the empirical interpretation, he claimed that the Kantian recourse
to a general notion of a priori intuition
– is more “artificial”,
– is not strictly necessary to solve the problem, and in fact it is combined
with some empirical understanding of the phenomena, and
– does not give an equally detailed explanation. 30
Hölder admitted that the Kantian conception could not be refuted, but he
was confident that future results in the history of mathematics, psychology and
physiology might furnish further arguments in favor of the empirical interpre-
tation. The history of mathematics might prove helpful, because a clarification
of the origin of geometrical concepts in the Egyptian culture might prove that
they originally had a practical aim. The physiological analysis of the spatial
properties of objects might suggest that immediate perceptions need to be
decomposed, so that there cannot be a unique a priori intuition but different
forms of intuition depending on vision, tact, muscular sensations, and move-
ment [Hölder 1900, 7, Eng. trans. 18]. This section anticipated some remarks
that can be found in the fourth chapter of Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis
[Poincaré 1902], but which were already in the essay on Geometry and Space
[Poincaré 1895]. 31 Rather, Hölder’s remarks are inspired by Helmholtz’s writ-
ings and Klaus Volkelt’s Experience and Reasoning [Volkelt 1886]. 32
A further argument advanced by Hölder was a reasoning to the best expla-
nation: empiricism can better explain human’s capacity to localize an object
in a determinate point of space. Quoting Lotze [Lotze 1884, 547ff.], Hölder
argued that the reference to individual perceptions can better explain the hu-
man capacity to locate an object in a singular point of space. 33 A general
a priori intuition that is assumed as a necessary condition of mathematical
30. “Certainly, a strict follower of Kant would still suspect that any of those results
obtained through measurement were already influenced by ready and exact intuition
taken as a condition of any experience. Maybe, if he wants to hold on to his point
of view, he could not be refuted. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that his
standpoint is artificial, and it seems legitimate to drop that standpoint, if one believes
one can do without it” [Hölder 1900, 6–7, Eng. trans. 18].
31. Hölder did not quote Poincaré in 1899, but quoted Science and Hypothesis
[Poincaré 1902] in 1924, as he discussed indirect proofs, the analysis of induction,
the compatibility of non-Euclidean geometries with experience, and the distinction
between the visual, the tactile and the motor space. It can thus be reasonably
assumed that he had not read Poincaré’s essay Space and Geometry [Poincaré 1895]
before giving the 1899 Inaugural Lecture.
32. In this text, Volkelt developed a theory of knowledge that inherited some fea-
tures from Descartes, Kant and Locke. He claimed that the starting point of knowl-
edge had to be subjective; yet objective—or rather trans-subjective—knowledge could
be reached once experiences were combined with logical deduction.
33. “The importance of the localization problem will certainly be denied by those
who consider the pure intuition of space as a condition of any perception. But they
must certainly admit that the empirical part of my perception, i.e., also my sensory
perceptions, must contain something that allows me, in a single case, to locate an
object in this way, and not otherwise, namely to see the object in this determinate
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judgement either cannot do that or has to be interpreted as merely introducing
an order between the empirical data, “but then we would basically be back to
the empirical point of view” [Hölder 1900, 17n, Eng. trans. 32].
In 1899, Hölder believed that it cannot be definitively established that
geometrical intuition derives from experience, because an a priori intuition
might also explain our knowledge of spatial objects. Yet, deduction is not
grounded in intuition, so, whatever the philosophical debate on the origin of
geometrical concepts, it should have no relevance for the study of mathematical
deduction [Hölder 1900, 8, Eng. trans. 19].
3.2.2 Kant’s thesis can neither be proved nor refuted
Secondly, Hölder considered Kantian geometrical apriorism as a hypothesis
that is non provable and non refutable, and as such has poor explanatory
power. In The Mathematical Method Hölder advanced the same argument in
defense of empiricism that he had already suggested in Intuition and Reasoning
(see above, section 3.2.1): the Kantian objection to Helmholtz’s theory does
not hold because there is no fallacy of vicious circle. But then he added:
I would only like [...] to remark here that this [Kantian] concep-
tion seems to be neither strictly provable nor strictly refutable,
and not even directly fruitful, because of its abstract nature.
[Hölder 1924, 368]
The same remark is repeated in § 132, where Hölder discusses criticism towards
Kantian apriorism: the only way to defend a priori intuition is to assume a
platonic idea of space as a non provable hypothesis. 34 Hölder’s answer to
this rhetorical question had already been given in Intuition and Reasoning :
the Kantian hypothesis does not have any explanatory power, because it gets
rid—too easily—of several relevant problems.
It seems to me that the empiricist view already has an advantage
in the fact that it allows a detailed explanation of intuition, while
the hypothesis assumed by the follower of Kant cuts off all the
rest. Indeed, it is always an advantage to set up new problems.
[Hölder 1900, 6–7, Eng. trans. 18]
position and not in some other position with respect to my body (cf. the theory of
‘local signs’ by Lotze [...])” [Hölder 1900, 16n, Eng. trans. 31].
34. “Under the given circumstances it seems to me that one can hold the Kantian
assumption only if one assumes, so to speak, behind the representative space an a
priori intuition that operates in it but is incompletely expressed by it, a sort of
platonic idea of space that is the a priori form and the condition of all experience.
Such an assumption could hardly be refuted. Actually, it is a hypothesis that is
not supported by any evidence. [...] And does it truly explain the applicability of
mathematics to experience?” [Hölder 1924, 384–385].
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3.2.3 The Kantian epistemological project is still viable and
fruitful
Thirdly, even if he did not accept the role attributed by Kant to intuition
in geometrical judgements, Hölder still considered Kant’s fundamental ques-
tion “how is pure mathematics possible” as a fruitful guideline for the episte-
mological and logical investigation of mathematics [Hölder 1924, 3]. In The
Mathematical Method, Hölder was involved in a truly epistemological project
and characterized it as an answer to Kant’s question:
– “How is pure mathematics possible?”,
which can be divided, in the case of geometry, into two different questions:
1. How can geometry be deductively built from its premises? and
2. Where do the axioms come from?
The two problems identified by Hölder in 1899 and analyzed with respect
to the different role of intuition—the origin of geometrical concepts and the
investigation of mathematical deduction—are here presented as two aspects of
Kant’s foundational program. Furthermore, Hölder’s terminology is even more
Kantian, because the expression ‘synthetic’ is here preferred to ‘constructed’.
3.2.4 Kant was right about arithmetic
Finally, Hölder agreed with Kant’s solution as far as arithmetic is concerned.
In particular, Hölder preferred Kantian apriorism to the extreme consequences
of an empiricist point of view, as for example the application of psychologism
to arithmetic, and the abandonment of the distinction between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge.
The acceptance of an empirical understanding of the origin of geometrical
axioms does not imply—according to Hölder—any change in the Kantian and
Platonic understanding of arithmetic as a necessary and unconditioned kind
of knowledge. 35 For this reason, Hölder did not share the position of the
empiricists who claim that arithmetic also has an empirical origin:
I am very far from speaking in favor of an extended empiricism,
for example a psychological conception that might transform the
laws of reasoning into habits of reasoning. [Hölder 1924, 7]
And for the same reason Hölder defended the distinction between a priori and
a posteriori knowledge. 36
35. “That arithmetic is an a priori science is certainly assumed by most mathemati-
cians. [...] The point of view that Plato, and among the moderns especially Kant,
validated, i.e., that there is unconditioned necessary knowledge that is grounded in
what is for us condition and criterion of all knowledge, might well remain in place.
But the borderline between what is necessary (a priori) and what belongs to experi-
ence is dragged to a different position” [Hölder 1924, 7].
36. “On the other hand, it is certainly possible to deny an unconditioned distinction
between two kinds of knowledge, an a priori and a posteriori kind of knowledge. Yet,
even if one does it, one cannot consider all reasoning processes as equivalent” [Hölder
1924, 395].
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4 The case of measurable magnitudes
The previous remarks about Hölder’s conception of geometry and ‘given’ con-
cepts are necessary to understand Hölder’s approach to the theory of measure-
ment, because the latter is taken to be a science that has axioms, like geom-
etry or mechanics [Hölder 1901, 3, Eng. trans. I, 237]. The axioms express
three properties of order—trichotomy, density, and Dedekind’s continuity—
and three properties of addition—positivity, solvability and associativity. If
the theory of magnitudes contains axioms about ‘given’ concepts, why is
Dedekind’s continuity included among them?
In the following, I will try to understand why Hölder considered Dedekind’s
continuity an indispensable property of measurable magnitudes, and what role
was played in the choice of the axioms for continuity both by the philosophical
understanding of geometry delineated in section 2 and by some new mathe-
matical results by Hölder himself. This might help us in understanding why he
included such a strong axiom as Dedekind’s postulate—which can be derived
from the axiom of Archimedes, together with the other axioms for measurable
magnitudes—notwithstanding his knowledge of Veronese’s non-Archimedean
theory and his own development of an original non-Archimedean model.
4.1 Theory of measurement and geometry
Like geometry and mechanics, the theory of measurement is also based—
according to Hölder—on axioms.
It is a different matter with geometry and mechanics, where cer-
tain axioms based upon sensory experience (or, as some want it,
upon intuition) are presupposed. As with geometry and mechan-
ics, the theory of measurable magnitudes can be based upon a
set of facts which I will call “axioms of magnitude” or “axioms of
quantity.” [Hölder 1901, Eng. trans. I, 237]
Hölder did not give any argument to prove the analogy. The latter cannot
be based on the fact that the theory of magnitudes shares all axioms with
geometry, because Hölder claimed that the axioms of measurement do not
occur as such in geometry. Even if the axioms of the theory of measurement
hold for the comparison and the addition of straight lines and surfaces, they can
be applied to geometry only provided certain further axioms are also assumed:
“Special axioms must be formulated again for geometrical applications” [Hölder
1901, Eng. trans. II, 346]. For example, the axioms of the theory of measurable
quantities can be applied to equalities between figures, only if the following
fact is also assumed, that two lines can be compared, and be either equal or
unequal.
On the contrary, the axioms of the theory of measurable mag-
nitudes satisfied by line segments follow from purely geometrical
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axioms for points and segments on a line. [Hölder 1901, Eng.
trans. I, 237]
In particular, the different assumptions that need to be made in the case
of lines and in the case of plane figures explain the difference between the
equality of lines, that is taken as ‘primary’, and the equality of content of
figures, that is taken as ‘constructible’. 37 Notwithstanding these differences,
the relationship between geometry and theory of measurement is yet so close,
that Hölder claimed their relative consistency. 38 The strict relationship to
geometry is also a reason why Hölder’s axiomatic system was based on the
operation of addition. 39
4.2 The continuity axiom
According to Hölder, the origin of the axioms of the theory of measurement is
similar to the genesis of the axioms of geometry: they are all derived from ex-
perience. We are thus justified in believing they will not lead to contradiction.
This cannot of course be proved by experience, but the empirical genesis and
the empirical fruitfulness in applications are considered by Hölder as reliable
reasons for the choice to include an axiom into the system (see section 2.2
above and section 4.3 below).
When Hölder published his essay on measurement, there were several other
texts discussing the same topic: two of them, written by Giuseppe Veronese
and Rodolfo Bettazzi did not include the postulate of Dedekind among the set
of axioms that characterize measurable magnitudes. More precisely, neither
of them included the axiom of Archimedes, nor, a fortiori, the postulate of
Dedekind, which can be derived from the axiom of Archimedes together with
the other axioms of the theory of magnitudes. 40 Hölder was well acquainted
37. “While with line segments it must be assumed that they can be compared and
necessarily found to be either equal or unequal, one can prove from axioms, in which
the word “area” does not occur, and on the basis of certain definitions, that two figures
can be compared with respect to area [...]. This is based on the fact that equality
of line segments is a primary concept and equality of areas in figures is a derived
geometrical concept [...]” [Hölder 1901, 3, Eng. trans. modif. I, 247].
38. “From the consistency of the axioms of magnitudes one can derive the consis-
tency of the geometrical axioms (α) to (κ) in Part II of this work and vice versa”
[Hölder 1901, Eng. trans. I, 248n].
39. “Geometrical and physical magnitudes, too, such as line segments, areas, times,
masses, forces, etc., as given in the first place, can only be added, and addition is only
possible with magnitudes of the same kind. Talk of the multiplication of geometri-
cal or physical magnitudes is based upon arbitrary convention. The present paper
assumes only such axioms as relate to the comparison and addition of magnitudes.
These axioms are sufficient to deduce the Euclidean theory of proportion and the
contemporary theory of measurement. The results concerning the multiplication of
magnitudes appear here only as corollaries to one of these theories” [Hölder 1901,
Eng. trans. I, 250n].
40. The axiom of Archimedes states that given two quantities a and b such that
a < b, there exists a natural number m ∈ N such that ma > b. The postulate of
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with both essays—he quoted the latter and discussed extensively the former—
as well as with the Euclidean theory of proportions, which he declared to be
the original nucleus of the theory of measurable magnitudes, containing the
axiom of Archimedes as the general form of continuity. So, Hölder must have
had some good reasons to include in a theory that declares to have an empirical
origin the postulate of Dedekind that cannot be verified empirically, and that
was not included in the ancient theory of proportions presented in Euclid’s
Elements nor in recent theories of measurement. What were his reasons?
The choice of axioms is up to a certain point arbitrary, 41 claimed Hölder,
yet he had reasons to include Dedekind’s axiom rather than alternative for-
mulations of continuity. Why did he not content himself with the axiom of
Archimedes, which is sufficient to compare any two magnitudes? Hölder de-
clared that his approach differed from those of Veronese and Bettazzi, but
did not explain what was wrong with their proposals. I suggest that he did
not share Veronese’s and Bettazzi’s choice of the axioms because he did not
share their epistemological aims, or at least what he took them to be. Hölder
interpreted the theory of Veronese as absolutely incompatible with Dedekind’s
theory of continuum, and the notion of magnitude developed by Bettazzi as a
mathematical formulation of the properties of special kinds of abstract mag-
nitudes rather than a theory that could apply to the usual physical and geo-
metrical magnitudes.
I intend only to propose a simple system of axioms from which
the properties of the ordinary continuum of magnitudes can be
derived; I do not intend to establish special kinds of magnitudes
as was done by Bettazzi [...]. [Hölder 1901, Eng. trans. I, 247n]
Taken as such, Hölder’s argument claims that one should hold to what
is usually considered to be a magnitude, and maintain the standard notion
of continuity. Hölder’s reasoning seems to be an argument ad populum: let’s
conform to what the majority of mathematicians usually do, i.e., to the stan-
dard notion of continuity, which was expressed by the Archimedes axiom in
Euclid’s time but which is now usually formulated along Dedekind’s lines. If
this was the argument, then it would not be so stringent. A brief comparison
with Bettazzi, Veronese and Dedekind might help us to clarify Hölder’s point
of view.
Dedekind asserts that if a system of quantities can be divided in two parts A and B
so that each element of A is at the left of each element of B, that is to say, that each
element of A is strictly inferior to each element of B, then there is one and only one
element that determines this section: it will be the maximum of A or the minimum
of B.
41. “Of course, the axioms chosen are arbitrary, up to a point, and it is a matter
of convenience whether Dedekind’s axiom of continuity plus axioms I to VI or some
other axioms are to be preferred” [Hölder 1901, Eng. trans. I, 248n].
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4.3 Bettazzi’s and Veronese’s approaches
What are the mistakes and the ambiguities that Hölder criticized in recent
theories? First of all, Dedekind’s postulate was presented as an arithmetical
axiom, 42 but according to Hölder the principle used in arithmetic is not an
axiom but a definition, whose consistency has to be proved. 43
Secondly, a theory of measurement has the principal aim of accounting for
physical operations executed on empirical objects: the operation of addition
should be in this sense more fundamental than the relation of order. Yet, in
the arithmetical analyses of the continuum, the latter is often based on some
order relation rather than on addition. But what was wrong with Bettazzi’s
and Veronese’s conceptions? Before answering this question, I will briefly sum-
marize the approach developed by Bettazzi and Veronese, who partly shared
Hölder’s epistemological aims, but arrived at different conclusions. This will
help us to understand that Hölder choice not to follow them was based on
epistemological grounds.
In Bettazzi’s Theory of Magnitudes [Bettazzi 1890] the properties of order
were introduced after the properties of addition, and continuity was taken to
be a property of magnitudes and not of numbers. Notwithstanding these sim-
ilarities, Bettazzi followed an abstract approach based on the construction of
structures that did not have an empirical counterpart—a method that Hölder
could not accept because it contrasted with his own empirical epistemology.
According to Bettazzi’s definition, a class of magnitudes was an Abelian addi-
tive semigroup, and could be defined independently from order [Ehrlich 2006],
[Cantù 2010]. Different kinds of order relation were taken into account and dif-
ferent abstract classes of measurable magnitudes were introduced: additivity—
which suffices, together with a relation of equality or inequality, to determine
the notion of a magnitude—was introduced independently from a total or-
der relation, which was considered as necessary to introduce measurement.
The order relation was not defined from the outset as Dedekind-continous: on
the contrary, different kinds of order allowed measurement, which was defined
not only for one-dimensional classes but also for multidimensional classes that
can be decomposed into ordered subclasses: in particular, non-Archimedean
classes. So, magnitudes were primarily defined as a structure and not by
reference to some physical operation that allows us to measure things.
42. On the contrary, in the theory of quantities Hölder gives a geometric formu-
lation of the postulate. “This last axiom is the axiom of continuity in geometrical
form. Dedekind first noted that the nature of the continuity of straight lines can be
expressed by this principle [Dedekind 1872, 93]. At the same time, Dedekind put less
value upon postulating this axiom for geometry, rather he took it as an opportunity
for his definition of the irrational numbers” [Hölder 1901, Eng. trans. II, 354].
43. “If one considers that the definition of each step requires a specific law, so
the concept of the totality of all steps means that we believe we can conceive the
totality of all the laws, which nonetheless require a certain stipulation. Yet, such a
wholly indeterminate totality could represent an inadmissible concept [Hölder 1924,
193–194].
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In Veronese’s Foundations of Geometry [Veronese 1891], continuity was
also taken to be a property of magnitudes rather than of numbers, and geom-
etry was taken to be a mixed science, whose postulates are partly empirical
and partly mathematical extensions of empirical facts. This point of view does
not seem too far from Hölder’s own epistemological approach: the postulate
of continuity is exactly one of these ‘ideal’ or purely logical concepts that do
not have a counterpart in experience, because it involves the concept of limit.
In particular, Veronese believed that Dedekind’s continuity, being defined for
numbers and being a part of arithmetic, didn’t need to be the only possible
or adequate description of the empirical world. He thus developed a different
notion of continuum, discussed in detail by Hölder himself.
Veronese’s continuum can be roughly described as a weaker form of con-
tinuity that can be geometrically represented by a sheaf of straight lines and
that includes Dedekind’s continuity as a special case. Each straight line is
Dedekind-continuous, and thus also Archimedean, but the whole sheaf, or-
dered from bottom to top and from left to right, is not [Cantù 1999, 107ff.].
Veronese’s system is thus a generalization of a Dedekind-continuous subsys-
tem and includes a generalization of the axiom of Archimedes: “for any two
magnitudes of the system such that one is smaller than the other, there is a
multiple of the smaller that exceeds the bigger”. Only, the notion of multiple
is not the usual one, based on natural numbers, but is built on an enlarged set
that includes infinitely small and great numbers.
Hölder, like most of his contemporaries—with the exception of Hans Hahn
[Hahn 1907] and Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer [Brouwer 1907]—overlooked
this aspect of Veronese’s theory, but focused only on the fact that Veronese,
like Bettazzi, questioned whether the Archimedean axiom might be a necessary
feature of magnitudes, and of measurable magnitudes in particular.
4.4 Hölder’s reasons to include Dedekind’s
continuity
Hölder admitted that it cannot be verified by our experience that Dedekind’s
continuity is an indispensable property of measurable magnitudes, but he con-
sidered this assumption as justified on the basis of some empirical experiences
and applications.
I will have to explain later (§ 99) that the question which one
of two concepts ‘precedes’ the other cannot always be definitely
answered. But in this case, to defend the Dedekindian axiom of
continuity, it would suffice to point out the fact that an axiom
gains importance in mathematics by allowing us, together with
the other introduced axioms, to dominate a multifaceted factual
domain. I will furnish evidence of this in the case of the axiom
of continuity; for example, by means of this axiom, significantly
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extended to time intervals, I will prove that of any two points
moving in the same direction on a straight line, the one that hap-
pens to have a bigger velocity must overtake the other. [Hölder
1924, 88]
Hölder thus advanced pragmatic reasons for the acceptance of Dedekind’s
continuity as a property of measurable magnitudes. But why could he not
admit a more general and weaker property, allowing Dedekind’s continuity to
be, as in the case of Veronese, just a special case of the former? The relevance
for the pragmatic applications could have thus been maintained. I suggest that
the answer is related both to some significant technical results to be found in
Hölder’s 1901 paper and to Hölder’s preference for an empirical conception of
geometry discussed in section 3.
4.4.1 Two technical results
As Philip Ehrlich has shown, there are two important results to be found in
Hölder’s paper on measurable quantities that concern non-Archimedian con-
tinuity: 1) the proof that the axiom of Archimedes can be derived from the
postulate of Dedekind’s cuts, together with the other axioms of Hölder’s the-
ory of measurable magnitudes, and 2) the construction of a particular model
of a non-Archimedian continuum.
(1) Hölder showed that the axiom of Archimedes can be derived from the
postulate of Dedekind together with the other axioms of measurable mag-
nitudes [Hölder 1901, 10ff., Eng. trans. 248]. Hölder was not the first
to prove this result, but he had several predecessors: Pasch, Veronese,
Stolz, Bettazzi, Hilbert. Pasch [Pasch 1882, 125–126], in particular, was
praised by Hölder as the one who first derived the axiom of Archimedes
from a projective formulation of Dedekind’s continuity postulate [Hölder
1924, 89]. Hölder’s proof was already advanced in 1899, and thus before
Hilbert’s book on the foundations of geometry, even if it is usually quoted
from the 1901 paper [Ehrlich 2006, 59–61].
(2) Hölder himself had developed an original model of a non-Archimedean
continuum that differs from those introduced by Veronese, Bettazzi and
Hilbert. 44 Ehrlich has shown that Hölder’s model of a non-Archimedean
continuum differs from the one by Veronese, because it satisfies Veronese’s
Principles I-IV but not Veronese’s Principle V, which expresses the gen-
eralized version of the Archimedes axiom and allows us to consider
Dedekind’s continuity as a special case of the non-Archimedian continuum
44. Whereas Hölder discussed in detail the model by Veronese, which is also
based on a geometrical understanding of magnitudes, he did not extensively ana-
lyze Bettazzi’s model, which appears to him as too abstract, nor Hilbert’s model,
which was based on arithmetical functions.
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[Ehrlich 2006, 97]. 45 Unlike Veronese’s model and like Du Bois-Reymond’s
theory, the system developed by Hölder satisfies divisibility [Ehrlich 2006,
94], which is relevant in physical measurements, because it guarantees the
divisibility of a magnitude in submultiples.
Hölder rightly assumed the counternominal implication of his result on the
derivability of the Archimedes axiom from Dedekind’s continuity. He thus held
that if the Archimedes axiom A can be derived from the Dedekind’s postulate
D and the others axioms of measurable magnitudes Γ, then, if A is negated,
D and Γ cannot both hold. 46 So, if one wants Dedekind’s continuity to hold
for pragmatic reasons, then one cannot refute the Archimedean axiom.
Now, given the original results developed by Hölder, and in particular the
fact that he had built a new non-Archimedean model, why did he stick to the
Archimedean property in the axiomatic formulation of the theory of measur-
able magnitudes? I will suggest that this technical result played a fundamental
role. A main reason why Hölder assumed from the beginning the validity of the
Archimedean axiom, even if he had constructed a consistent non-Archimedaen
model, was that he believed that in refuting it, he would have to abandon
Dedekind’s continuity altogether. This is true in Hölder’s non-Archimedean
model, but not generally in Veronese’s model, for Dedekind’s continuity can
be saved as a special case. Yet, why did he overlook the relation between
Veronese’s continuity and Dedekind’s continuity? My argument is that his
epistemological framework and its difference from Veronese’s perspective might
play a role here.
4.4.2 The epistemological framework
The mathematical choice of different axioms in the case of Hölder and Veronese
should be related to different epistemological frameworks. Both Veronese and
Hölder took inspiration from Pasch, but Veronese was interested in a math-
ematical hypothesis concerning an order relation that might differ from the
standard one, and yet be compatible with our intuition of physical objects (a
bundle of parallel sticks, for example). Hölder’s approach was on the contrary
the result of an exclusive interest in the empirical foundation of measurement.
Veronese considered geometry as a mixed science (partly empirical and
partly ideal, i.e., going beyond the empirical realm), or—as Hölder would have
said—the result of a combination of hypothetico-synthetic concepts and pure
synthetic concepts. Hölder, on the contrary, considered all primitive proposi-
tions of geometry—and thus of measurement theory—as axioms, i.e., as based
45. Veronese’s absolute continuity also known as ‘Archimedes generalized’ is for-
mulated as follows: “if a and b are two intervals of the system and a < b, there is a
determined symbol of multiplication (number) η such that ηa > b”. Hölder’s prop-
erty of divisibility requires that “for each member A of the system and each positive
integer n, there is an X in the system such that nX = A”.
46. If (Γ ∧D) ` A, then ¬A ` ¬(Γ ∧D).
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on experience. According to him, the hypotheses that Veronese was trying
to anchor to experience, did not really apply to experience—and in fact the
model that Hölder suggested as a realization of Veronese’s system, was based
on functions and not on magnitudes [Hölder 1901, 12n, Eng. trans. 249]. 47 On
the contrary, the Archimedean property, apart from being present in Euclid’s
Elements (Book VI, § 9), appeared to him as relevant for empirical applications
and as a standard component of our “usual continuum” [Hölder 1901, 11, Eng.
trans. 249]. Dedekind’s continuity was praised for its compatibility with the
Archimedean axiom but also for its important role in proofs and applications.
But there is one more reason: using Dedekind’s continuity, it is possible to
establish at the same time a very tight connection between the
Euclidean theory of proportions and the the notion of measure-
ment on the one hand, and the arithmetical theory of irrational
numbers on the other hand. [Hölder 1901, 19, Eng. trans. 241]
Hölder assumed the definition of the arithmetical continuum, and then
showed that the modern theory of proportion (or theory of measurement) can
be grounded only if one shows not only that to any geometrical measure of
a magnitude there corresponds a number, but that also to any geometrical
sum of two magnitudes a and b there corresponds the arithmetical sum of
the corresponding numbers that measure a and b. He thus introduced, like
Bettazzi before him but unlike Veronese, a representation theorem that justifies
the fact that we can apply numbers to measure magnitudes. Veronese, on the
contrary, did not conceive the idea of a representation theorem, because he was
far away from the idea of establishing a tight connection between arithmetic
and geometry. On the contrary, he aimed to show that the notion of continuity
is different in geometry and in arithmetic, and that, given the fact that the
former is fundamental, the latter might not be an adequate description of
continuity in general.
The radical demarcation between arithmetic and geometry is not only a
matter of epistemological preference or philosophical inclination: it affects, and
not in a regressive way, Hölder’s mathematical works, because it is at the basis
of the representation theorem that he developed in The Axioms of Quantity.
Having assumed that real numbers are a symbolical representation of empiri-
cal magnitudes, Hölder perceived the necessity to prove that, if the symbolic
system should measure (represent) the system of magnitudes, it should have
a similar structure. This was not due to the fact that he had overlooked the
mathematical investigation of new systems of quantities: on the contrary, he
developed an original model of non-Archimedean magnitudes. Rather, having
related the theory of quantities to geometry and the latter to certain empir-
ical operations of superposition, Hölder saw no reason for adopting a higher
generality in his approach to measurement.
47. That they could not be falsified by experience itself was not a sufficient argu-
ment, because neither Veronese’s continuum nor Dedekind’s continuum can be.
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5 Conclusion
I will now summarize some of the complex and interesting relations between
Hölder and other mathematicians and geometers of the 19th century, as they
emerge from the reconstruction of Hölder’s epistemology suggested in this
paper. Hölder’s relations to previous or contemporary authors are not linear,
but complex and multifaceted: this explains the originality of his position,
which could be prima facie assimilated to that of other authors, but reveals,
upon deeper investigation, its peculiarity.
5.1 The demarcation between geometry and
arithmetic
In section 2, I have investigated the distinction between ‘given’ and ‘con-
structed’ that Hölder had introduced already in Intuition and reasoning, al-
though he clarified it further in The Mathematical Method : rather than being
just a difference concerning the origin of mathematical concepts (as was the
case in Gauß, who declared geometry to be an empirical science), it is a dif-
ference concerning the possibility of defining the concept by means of a con-
structive activity. It cannot be reduced to the modern axiomatic distinction
between primitive and derived concepts, nor to the epistemological distinction
between a priori and a posteriori, but is rather related to the formal genesis
of the object itself.
While talking of activity, Hölder said something similar to what Hermann
Graßmann had described as the genesis of pure mathematical concepts through
laws. The same does not hold for geometry, according to Graßmann, because
the latter is not a pure mathematical theory but has to assume the three-
dimensionality of space as something given. Even if Hölder had a different
understanding of what is given in geometry, because he considered points and
lines among given concepts, he had a similar understanding of what given is
opposed to, i.e., something that can be defined by its own constructive law.
Hölder’s use of the distinction given-constructed to demarcate geometry from
arithmetic is quite near to Graßmann’s use of the distinction between what
is posited by thought and what stands in front of our thought, a distinction
that Graßmann used to demarcate formal from real sciences. But there are
also relevant differences, because Hölder remarked that not all geometrical
concepts are given. The mixed nature of geometry is more similar to the
conception of Giuseppe Veronese, who had made an effort to reconcile the belief
in the empirical genesis of basic geometrical truths with the ideal constructions
required by non-Euclidean, non-Archimedean or hyperspace geometries.
Anyway, Hölder did not quote Graßmann, but Zindler, a disciple of
Meinong who insisted on the fact that there is only one primitive concept
in arithmetic while there are many different concepts in geometry: for this
reason geometrical primitives are mainly concepts denoting relations. On this
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point Hölder differed from Zindler, but also from Veronese, Hilbert and modern
axiomatics. Against the tendency introduced by Pasch to identify geometrical
primitives as specific relations between elements (e.g., betweenness), Hölder
insisted on the necessity of distinguishing two kinds of axiomatic concepts:
concepts denoting objects and concepts denoting relations. This remark can
be read as a reaction against the tendency to call geometry any abstract the-
ory on relations of betweenness, connection, order that did not take into ac-
count certain fundamental properties of geometrical objects. With this respect,
Hölder’s position is again similar to that of Veronese, who refused to admit
that certain mathematical theories, like Poincaré’s theory of the hyperboloid
of one sheet or Hilbert’s non-arguesian theory, could be called ‘geometry’, ex-
actly because they did not preserve certain properties of the geometrical object
“straight line”.
The demarcation between arithmetic and geometry was further developed
in The Mathematical Method, where a different terminology was used for con-
structed concepts, being now called hypothetico-synthetic (in geometry) and
pure synthetic (in arithmetic). Furthermore, the distinction is compared with
Meinong’s opposition between Zusammenstellung and Zusammensetzung, re-
sulting in a clarification of the different kinds of activities that can be re-
spectively associated to arithmetic (to order in a sequence or to assign) and
geometry (to superpose segments). Hölder adhered to Kant’s apriorism as far
as arithmetic is concerned, defending the distinction between a priori and a
posteriori reasoning processes.
5.2 Axiomatic method and mathematical practice
Pasch’s effort to eliminate intuition from deduction was the starting point of
most mathematicians and logicians of the time. Hölder was highly sensitive
to this issue and was willing to adopt Peano’s symbolic reconstructions of
geometry as a calculus in order to show that intuition does not play any role
in deduction. The latter was in effect the center of Hölder’s interest, but in
a quite original and different way with respect to the contemporary dominant
traditions in axiomatics.
Hölder’s interest was directed to the formulation of the primitive proposi-
tions of a given theory, and to the analysis of the kind of activities involved in
deduction itself rather than to the investigation of independence and consis-
tency results. Although sharing with Couturat and Russell a certain concep-
tion of arithmetic as purely formal, Hölder held a radically different conception
of logic: it is not a universal theory that precedes all mathematical disciplines,
but a disciplinary investigation aiming at isolating the specific deductive pat-
terns that are used in different branches of mathematics.
From this perspective, he was much more interested in the analysis of in-
creasing levels of complexities in our mathematical activities, and in the limits
of the use of deduction to study deduction itself. For this very reason, he
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adopted a different approach, based on a case by case investigation of mathe-
matical deductive procedures that cannot itself be developed into a symbolic
language, but can be accomplished only by means of the natural language.
This idea of a general logic that arises from a never definitively achieved
investigation of mathematical deductive activities explains the distance with
respect to Hilbert’s effort to prove metamathematical results inside axiomatic
systems, but also the radical difference with respect to Peano, who aimed
to express all mathematics by means of a unique symbolic language, or even
adopting a standardized universal language like the latino sine flexione for
scientific communication. Hölder on the contrary, believed that the specificity
of mathematics had nothing to do with the symbols used to represent it, but
rather with the kind of activity, i.e., deduction, deployed in its practice. For
this reason he developed a sort of empirical study of deduction: this is one of
the most original aspects of Hölder’s investigation, and probably also a reason
why his main book went largely unnoticed in his time.
5.3 Philosophy of mathematics
The interest in the investigation of mathematical deduction and in the con-
struction of a general logic that can be derived from the examination of specific
cases is the core of Hölder’s epistemology of mathematics. Yet, in Intuition
and Reasoning, and again in The Mathematical Method he often discussed the
position of different philosophers on the questions of apriorism and empiri-
cism. Hölder’s point of view is clear: such questions belong to the philosophy
of mathematics but do not have any influence on how mathematical deduction
works or is developed. The mentioned questions can be asked with respect
to the genesis of mathematical objects, but do not have anything to do with
what mathematics actually is.
This might be a reason why Hölder’s position was partially unresolved,
both with respect to empiricism and Kantian apriorism. Another reason might
be the fact that Hölder was not only a mathematician, but had truly philosoph-
ical and argumentative skills that urged him to distinguish his own preferences
or inclination for a philosophical position from the possibility of corroborating
or confuting its claims.
The adhesion to the Kantian project was not evident in Intuition and
Reasoning, neither in the terminology—no use of the term “synthetic” was
made—nor in the conception of geometry, yet Hölder apparently refrained from
a too strong and explicit criticism of Kant’s apriorism. On the contrary, in The
Mathematical Method there is an explicit revival of the Kantian epistemological
project, which is mentioned in the introduction as the starting point of the
whole essay. Besides, Hölder’s conception of arithmetic is compatible with the
Kantian perspective, even if the criticism towards the Kantian conception of
geometry is more explicit than in his inaugural lecture.
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A similar ambivalent relation was developed by Hölder towards empiricism.
On the one hand, he was strongly influenced by Pasch concerning the foun-
dation of geometry, and by Helmholtz concerning the theory of measurement.
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of a genetic theory of geometrical ob-
jects and measurable magnitudes, Hölder resisted some possible consequences
of an empiricist position. For example, he abhorred the application of psychol-
ogism to arithmetic, and the extension of empiricism to ‘pure’ mathematics.
5.4 Conclusive remarks
The difficulty of classifying Hölder as well as his ambivalence towards apriorism
and empiricism are already a proof of the unconventionality of his position.
His ability to analyze advantages and limits of the axiomatic method and
of the traditional debate in the philosophy of mathematics is typical of a
scholar who was both a practicing mathematician and a practicing philosopher,
and believed in the inexhaustibility of both practices. It also reveals a deep
knowledge of the contemporary mathematical and philosophical debate, but
unfortunately only up until the First World War, because The Mathematical
Method appeared in 1924 but in an almost unrevised version with respect to
its initial project.
Hölder’s epistemological approach does not prove to be generally regressive,
if one considers the relation to his own mathematical research: sometimes the
effect is innovative, as is the case for the distinction between arithmetic and
geometry that allowed him to develop a representation theorem, even if it was
sometimes limitative, as in the case of the strict association between geometry
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